In Sri Lanka�€™s civil war, the Sri Lankan military seems poised to take the rebel capitol Kilinochchi in northern Sri Lanka. Across the thin waterway separating Sri Lanka from India, politicians in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu have recently called attention to the plight of Sri Lankan Tamils caught in an increasingly aggressive Sri Lankan counter-insurgency effort against Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The recent political row, in which Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Karunaninidhi threatened to submit the resignations of his party's Lokha Sabha MPs, provoked massive public outpouring of sympathy in Tamil Nadu and a hurried visit to Sri Lanka by the Prime Minister�€™s diplomatic point-man, Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee.

How do we interpret Tamil Nadu�€™s agitation in support of the Sri Lankan Tamils? The Sri Lankan Tamils have long suffered from the effects of both insurgency and counter-insurgency, and Tamil Nadu has not made a consistent and forceful effort to lobby on their behalf. Why is Tamil Nadu suddenly speaking out for Sri Lankan Tamils?

Many observers account for Tamil Nadu's sporadic outbursts as a part of its local political game of one-upmanship. The political rivalries in Tamil Nadu produce populist stands on hot-button political issues, but political theatrics alone do not explain the attention Tamil Nadu gives to the Sri Lankan Tamil situation. There is genuine concern for Sri Lankan Tamils by Tamils in India. Also, there are legitimate security concerns for Tamil Nadu as LTTE faces being pushed out of Sri Lanka.

Tamil Nadu could legitimately sympathize with Sri Lankan Tamils squeezed tighter than ever by a determined counter-insurgency and desperate insurgency. The Sri Lankan government has enforced a black-out of information from the rebel areas by deeming the war zone unsafe for international humanitarian aid agencies. The aid agencies, most of which have pulled out, were the last impartial observers left in those areas since media has long been banned from war zones. No information comes out (beyond government and rebel reports), and very little aid trickles in for displaced and downtrodden civilians largely dependent on it. So Tamil Nadu's recent response indicates its compulsion to speak-out at the point when Sri Lankan Tamils pass a certain threshold level of suffering and neglect.

Alternatively, one might think that the Tamil Nadu coalition calling for intervention wants to throw a life-preserver to the twenty-five year old insurgency. The Sri Lankan government has made its suspicions explicit with Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the Defence Secretary and President's brother saying, �€œthey [LTTE] are trying to get Tamil Nadu (leaders) to pressurize the Indian government to pressurize the Sri Lankan government�€�we know there is no other way for the LTTE.�€ The Sri Lankan minister's accusation is likely stronger than the Tamil Nadu coalition's complicity with LTTE, though two of the parties in the coalition are historically pro-LTTE and would like to see the insurgency live on.

Another interest Tamil Nadu has in exerting its influence on the Sri Lankan conflict is to control the Sri Lankan refugee situation in the state. Fleeing Tamil refugees flock to the shores of Tamil Nadu where the government tries to manage many of them in specially setup camps. As fighting intensifies and more northern Sri Lankans are displaced, Tamil Nadu's population of Sri Lankan refugees escalates. Local Tamils, despite their shared ethnicity with the refugees, have in some cases grown to resent this new competition for local jobs and government resources.

Tamil Nadu must also be aware that its territory is one of the best possible bases of retreat for LTTE. Already Tamil Nadu�€™s police force along with the Indian Navy and Coast Guard battle LTTE operatives and suppliers in south India. According to an Indian Coast Guard official, �€œThe worsening situation in north and northeast Sri Lanka will result in a bigger influx of refugees, certainly a worrying factor. We have no way of knowing the individuals' identity�€”whether they are harmless victims of war or operatives from the banned Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.�€ A definitive military victory for the Sri Lankan military may result in a more pervasive law and order problem in Tamil Nadu instigated by exiled LTTE fighters. Tamil Nadu offers the largest sea of Tamils to disappear into anywhere in the world. And the close geographical proximity is convenient for LTTE operatives to surreptitiously slip under the Sri Lankan military's net. LTTE's relationship with Tamil Nadu has been battered over the course of the insurgency, but it certainly continues to maintain deep connections with the champions of �€œTamil Power�€ in Tamil Nadu, who will provide local bases of support for LTTE �€œon the run�€.

Tamil Nadu�€™s response to Sri Lanka�€™s civil war is based on the interplay of issues relating sympathy for Sri Lankan Tamils and concern over the refugee situation. These issues combined with the domestic political environment dictate the timing and extent of Tamil Nadu�€™s attention to the civil war, making it an inconsistent and opportunistic supporter of Sri Lankan Tamils.