Who calls the shots?
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July 2008
By Rohit Honawar
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The general elections in Pakistan were conducted amongst much expectation and optimism that a new government and a return to democracy would usher in a period of change and stability which had eluded the country in recent times. The PPP led coalition entered the political arena on the back of an election victory which was arguably achieved through the sympathy vote of an electorate mourning the loss of their recently assassinated leader, Benazir Bhutto. The man in charge, Asif Zardari, spoke of no political credentials and was tasked with forming a government with an increasingly unpopular President at its helm; a coalition partner at odds with the former general and determined to see through ‘his party’s’ political agenda and; influential external powers waving an ‘invisible hand’ over issues of national importance. In conjunction, Pakistan was and continues to be challenged by numerous issues which threaten the social fabric of the country, while notwithstanding the fact, that Zardari has perhaps inherited the seat to arguably the most dangerous, politically volatile and strategically important country in the world. In the months following the elections, Zardari has matured as a politician – depicting attributes of an astute individual, which Pakistan’s leadership often exemplifies. Yet the war on terrorism, which is being fought on multiple fronts, poses several questions – none more so important than that of ‘Who calls the shots in Pakistan’?
Pakistan’s status as a frontline ally to the American led war on terrorism has placed the political establishment and military in the precarious position of appeasing and collaborating with foreign powers, while remaining a politically sovereign nation, entrusted with upholding Pakistan’s national interests. In recent months, American drones have violated Pakistani airspace on several occasions, leading to the deaths of civilians, militants and security personnel. While each attack has been strongly condemned by Pakistan’s political leadership, the military has always denied knowledge of such attacks and reserved its commentary to a select few. The drone attacks on the 14th of May in Bajaur Agency came less than a month after the US promised to curb airstrikes on suspected militants in Pakistani territory and, on the heels of the civilian leadership categorically stating that no foreign power would be allowed to violate Pakistan’s sovereignty. While the military’s stoic silence might have been intended to fane ignorance, it would be naĂŻve to think that they were unaware of the intended airstrikes. Conversely, it is likely that while on the surface attacks of this nature are vehemently opposed by the civilian leadership and denied by the military, they are in fact endorsed and supported by both branches – Until most recently US airstrikes have not targeted Pakistan’s military nor has the military been in the area of attack. The strikes have also allowed Pakistan to tackle terrorists and the Taliban through external means, while denying responsibility and approval at the public level. With US approval ratings at an all time low in Pakistan, the calculated risk of allowing an already battered ‘bogey man’ to take a few more hits at the benefit of giving Pakistan’s civilian leadership and military legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate, is a small price to pay in the strategic long term.
More importantly however, Pakistan’s flagging economy, deteriorating internal situation and, historical disposition towards political corruption and nepotism, has left the country in volatile circumstances, requiring ‘assistance’ from external forces. This ‘assistance’ has come by the way of approximately $10 billion in aid from the US since September 11th 2001, in addition to the $956 million pledged by the UK over the next three years, as well as millions more by the EU. This dependence on foreign countries and namely the US, to sustain Pakistan’s economy, undoubtedly provides Washington with the ability to wield a certain degree of influence over Islamabad’s policy vis-Ă -vis the ‘war on terrorism’ and, certain internal matters. This is evidenced by continued US and NATO incursions over Pakistani territory, the breakdown in the much publicised peace pact with Tehreek-e-Taliban and Washington’s continued support to President Musharraf.
In its most vocal statement to date, Pakistan’s military denounced the US drone attack in Mohmand Agency as hitting “…at the very basis of cooperation [and that it reserved] the right to protect our citizens and soldiers from aggression”. Islamabad’s condemnation of the “unprovoked and cowardly” act was the first for a country which had thus far, towed Washington’s line and either denied knowledge of or, taken responsibility for earlier incidents. Several political commentators expected a shift in Pakistan’s policy to one which protected their national interests and distanced the country from ‘western influence’. However as has often been the case, the political and military outrage over the incident and previous incursions was short lived, with Pakistan’s Defence Minister Ahmed Mukhtar implying that the sanctity of Pakistan’s borders had not been violated and, that the strikes were killing senior Al Qaeda leaders. While these incidents might have been in response to Pakistan’s unpopular peace agreement with Tehreek-e-Taliban, the fact of the matter is that they continue to occur unabated and that the peace talks have broken down, ushering in a return to terrorist attacks. There is no secret to America’s disapproval of Islamabad’s negotiations with the local Taliban. However, what is interesting is that a policy which was internally hailed by the public and political circles, broke down in no small measure (though other reasons have been put forth) because of Washington’s continued threat to cut aid to Pakistan if it did not adopt a more pro-active and tougher stance to combat terrorism. In addition, the political rhetoric of the PPP and PML-N demanding the resignation and/or impeachment of President Musharraf was dealt a severe blow when the Bush administration’s staunchest Pakistani ally was given a vote of confidence by the American President and the Secretary of State. Furthermore, the fact that Musharraf continues to be met by visiting US and Western dignitaries and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Ashfaq Kayani, negates the fact that he is a ‘dummy’ President with minimal powers. More importantly, it demonstrates that the US wields considerable influence in Pakistan through its assurances of economic incentives and, that President Musharraf remains a power center and integral part of America’s strategic plans.
The recent unprovoked firing by Pakistani troops to assist in an infiltration bid in the Samba sector, 400 km south of Srinagar, points to a possible nexus between the military and presidential palace, with the civilian government’s role nullified by these ‘emerging’ power centers. While Pakistan’s government denied any involvement, it is unlikely that an incident of such magnitude which violated the 2003 ceasefire could have occurred without the knowledge and/or approval of highly placed individuals. However, that the incident occurred on the backdrop of Pakistan’s political leadership reiterating their desire to promote trade and economics as a priority with India, raises doubts over the involvement of the coalition government in making such a move. More importantly, COAS Kayani recently “…reaffirmed the commitment of Pakistan Army to the Kashmir cause…” highlighting that the political future of the territory was important to the leader of the most powerful institution in Pakistan. Furthermore, Kayani’s determination to view the issue as per the aspirations of the Kashmiri people and not through trade and economics depicts a situation whereby the military and civilian leadership view the issue through opposite perspectives. For COAS Kayani, the Kashmir issue is likely to be a matter of pride for a military which took a severe beating in recent years and, which is looking to restore itself to the high regard it once held within Pakistani society. In addition, the coalition government’s denial over the firing incident, coupled with Kayani’s statements, lends credence to the notion that while the COAS has honoured his word of separating the army from politics, the ‘foreign policy’ of the country, so to speak, remains an integral aspect to the Pakistan army’s identity and legitimacy.
While Kayani has ensured the army does not interfere in the internal matters of the nation, his publicly announced support to the Kashmir issue, illustrates that the army will have a role to play vis-Ă -vis future bilateral relations with India. Furthermore, Kayani’s previous posting as head of the Inter Service Intelligence Agency (ISI), re-affirms his virtually impenetrable control over Pakistan’s military and, further justifies the theory that the cross border firing and the Kabul embassy bombing could have occurred with ISI involvement and without the knowledge of the coalition government. In addition, the close ties between COAS Kayani and the Presidential House, suggests that both branches are aware, if not providing approval to such incidents and, that there are likely to be further infiltration bids in the run up to the state elections, while Indian interests overseas and within the country will continue to remain under threat. It would be foolhardy to assume that the February elections have ushered in a new era in Pakistani politics. The firmly entrenched military led by the powerful General Ashfaq Kayani and supported by President Musharraf, continues to call the shots and control Pakistan’s power structure, with the civilian leadership providing the much needed façade of a democratic nation voted into power ‘by the people and for the people.’ .