An acclaimed expert in conflict resolution, Sundeep Waslekar founded the Mumbai-based International Centre for Peace Initiatives in 1990. In 1998, the policy thinktank embarked on a major strategic study, based on original research, of the Pakistani polity. In an interview, he tells Rahul Shivshankar that any immediate hopes of peace between the two countries are exaggerated: Why should your study be regarded as any more accurate or objective than those by others in the business?
First, of all the studies that have been undertaken on Pakistan — and there aren’t many — this is perhaps the most comprehensive. Besides none of the previous ones had looked ahead into the future. In order to ensure that it was accurate, maximum emphasis was placed on conducting it from a Pakistani perspective. The study is based on strategic interactions with several hundred people in Pakistan, ranging from ordinary villagers to business leaders, to cabinet ministers. As for information, we’ve relied exclusively on ‘official’ agencies, besides drawing upon Urdu newspapers and books written by Pakistani scholars. Indian sources — either government or private — have been deliberately eschewed. What are its major findings?
Though the report focuses on many aspects of the polity, including trade, education, inter-provincial relations and demography, its most exciting findings are those concerned with politics. We have predicted that General Musharraf, for example, might be toppled in a coup or otherwise eased out in eight months or so. We also believe that there will be more ‘‘Kargil-type’’ conflicts — at least three — over the next decade. Ironically though they will not be over Kashmir. We feel that these limited conflicts are more likely to be over resources such as water and also as a result of Pakistan’s plummeting economic fortunes. Even if a mutually acceptable solution to the Kashmir issue is found, the conflict between the two countries will not end. Interestingly, the possibility of nuclear war breaking out is almost zero, at least over Kashmir, as Pakistan’s Punjabi establishment will not sacrifice its interests for the sake of Kashmiris. What makes you so sure that Gen Musharraf will be overthrown? Who will succeed him?
General Musharraf has been able to consolidate his power base due to the backing of top officers, including the corps commanders and principal staff officers. Unlike Nawaz Sharif, who rarely sought advice from his cabinet, General Musharraf consults his military cabinet and has zealously guarded against imposing his own ideals or ambitions on the commanders. In fact, whenever he has not been able to mobilise a consensus, he has chosen to give up his plans. He has thus ensured the unity of command. But now with the general openly acting as an agent of the US and reneging on earlier promises — easing up on the anti-corruption drive, backtracking on anti-jehadi measures, rigging a referendum and suspending political activity — he is becoming very unpopular and this is putting pressure on the unity of command. Two contrary scenarios might emerge. First, the jehadis, fast emerging as the voice of conscience in Pakistan, might prey on not only the frustrations of the people but also those of sympathetic corps commanders — there are at least 100 such serving generals who have sharp differences with their seniors — and force them to stage a coup. Alternately, the challenge to him might come from — with the active blessings of Washington — pro-US generals who regard him as a liability in the war against terrorism. But hasn’t the Bush administration repeatedly claimed that General Musharraf is their best bet?
Though the US will try its best to save the general, it’s not as if there are no alternatives. In the present set-up there are at least two individuals who could take over from him. The first being the vice chief of army staff, General Mohammad Yusuf, who is known for his modern and liberal views. Then there is the chairman of the joint chief of staff committee, General Aziz. Though the latter has an Islamist image he has supported General Musharraf’s policy decisions, including offering support for the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. But, unless the successor assumes charge of a dramatically altered Pakistan, he will function in much the same manner as the present incumbent, except that he will be far more committed to the reform programme. Will we reach a settlement on Kashmir in the near future?
Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir will be influenced by its policies towards Islamic fundamentalist groups. It’s crucial for Pakistan to rein in these groups before the resumption of dialogue with India. Not because New Delhi is demanding this as a pre-condition for talks. But because if these elements are not effectively checked they will undermine any efforts at reconciliation by Pakistan, by dubbing it as a sell-out to India. Pakistan’s moves on Kashmir will also be influenced by the US action on its western borders. In our assessment, the US will persuade Pakistan to explore a negotiated solution with India on Kashmir. In any event, there is no denying that the Kashmir issue will continue to dominate relations for the next many years before being overtaken by other issues such as the impending water scarcity in Pakistan. |
